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CASE NOTE
Property Law-MINNESOTA APPLIES THE UNJUST ENRICHMENT Doc-
TRINE TO CONTRACT FOR DEED CANCELLATIONS-Anderson v. DeLisle,
352 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
The contract for deed is a widely recognized alternative method of
financing real estate purchases. The popularity of this device has
been enhanced largely by the relative certainty and ease with which a
contract for deed can be cancelled if its terms are not satisfied. A
recent Minnesota Court of Appeals case significantly changes con-
tract for deed law in Minnesota. In Anderson v. DeLisle, I the Minne-
sota Court of Appeals allowed a defaulting vendee to recover the
costs he incurred in adding improvements to land purchased under a
contract for deed. 2 The improvements were made prior to execution
of the earnest money agreement. 3 The vendor knew at the time of
execution that the vendee was having financial difficulties. 4 Anderson
is the first Minnesota case allowing a defaulting vendee to recover
under the theory of unjust enrichment when there was no fraud or
mistake inducing the vendee to enter into the contract. 5 The case
expands Minnesota law concerning when defaulting vendees may re-
cover from vendors.
A subsequent court of appeals case, Brakke v. Hilgers,6 discussed
the application of the unjust enrichment doctrine in dicta.7 Even
though the Bakke court attempted to restrict the parameters of a
cause of action for unjust enrichment, the court's discussion will not
significantly reduce the future use of the doctrine in contract for
deed litigation. Thus, the Anderson holding will continue to have a
major impact on the real estate bar in Minnesota.
1. 352 N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984), pet. for reh. denied (Minn. Nov. 8,
1984). The case is officially reported as Anderson v. DeLisle although the parties'
briefs are captioned Andersen v. DeLisle. The vendee will be referred to as "Ander-
sen" throughout the Case Note.
2. Id. at 796.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. The possibility of such recovery has been mentioned in dicta, but no decision
has actually allowed recovery. See, e.g., Zirinsky v. Sheehan, 413 F.2d 481, 486-90
(8th Cir. 1969); Cady v. Bush, 283 Minn. 105, 110, 166 N.W.2d 358, 361-62 (1969).
6. 374 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
7. For a discussion of Brakke, see infra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
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Use of the contract for deed benefits both vendee and vendor.8
Under a contract for deed, the vendor retains title to the property
while relinquishing possession to the vendee.9 The vendee makes
periodic payments to the vendor until the purchase price and ac-
crued interest are paid.lO Title remains with the vendor until the
debt is retired.''
The contract for deed provides many buyers with an opportunity
to purchase land which may not otherwise be available.12 For exam-
ple, contracts for deed are most commonly used when interest rates
on conventional mortgages are high, when the buyer does not qual-
ify for institutional financing, or when the buyer prefers to use capi-
tal for operating costs rather than for a down payment.'13 This form
of conveyance is also advantageous to the vendor.14
8. Amundson & Rotman, Depression Jurisprudence Revisited:. Minnesota's Moratorium
on Mortgage Foreclosure, 10 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 805, 810 n.12 (1984).
The contract for deed is the most commonly used substitute for the conventional
mortgage. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW
§ 3.25, at 79 (1979); Nelson & Whitman, The lustallUent Land Contract-A National
Viewpoint, 1977 B.Y.U.L. REV. 541; see Note, Installment Land Sale Contract-Forfeiture
Clause Held Invalid-Seller's Remedy for Breach of the Contract is to Obtain a Judicial Sale of
the Property-Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381 (Ky. 1979), 7 N. Ky. L. REV. 303, 304
(1980).
Contracts for deed have been criticized as excessively pro-seller. See generallv,
Corbin, The Right of a Vendee to the Restitution of Installments Paid, 40 YALE LJ. 1013,
1029-30 (1931) (criticism of contracts for deed is largely based on the concept of
forfeiture because allowing the vendor to keep payments made as well as the land
oversecures the seller and provides a windfall upon default); Note, Folfeiture and the
Iowa Installment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 786, 787 (1961) (contract for deed
vendee not afforded the protections of a mortgagor); Comment, Forfeiture: The Anom-
aly of the Land Sale Contract, 41 ALB. L. REV. 71, 72 (1977) (vendors are usually unrep-
resented by counsel and ignorant of land contract hazards).
Despite these criticisms, contracts for deed remain popular among both buyers
and sellers. For a discussion of the advantages of contracts for deed, see R. KRATOVIL
& R. WERNER, REAL ESTATE LAW 368-78 (8th ed. 1983); Amundson & Rotman, supra,
at 810 n.12.
9. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 541.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. HALL & BRUESS, REAL PROPERTY AND SECURITY FINANCING IN MINNESOTA
REAL ESTATE 1975, 220-26 (Minn. Continuing Legal Education 1983). See R.
KRATOVIL & R. WERNER, supra note 8, at 368; Power, Land Contracts as Security Devices,
12 WAYNE L. REV. 391, 395-99 (1966).
13. See supra note 12.
14. The contract for deed is regarded as pro-vendor because of the ease of termi-
nation as opposed to a traditional mortgage which requires a foreclosure sale. See
Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 542-43.
The procedures for foreclosure of mortgages vary from state to state. The two
most common methods are judicial foreclosure and foreclosure by power of sale.
Under a judicial foreclosure, a public sale of the property results after a full judicial
proceeding involving all interested parties. In a foreclosure by power of sale, no
judicial proceeding is required, and the property is generally sold by the sheriff.
[Vlol. 12
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The contract for deed increases the marketability of the vendor's
land by expanding the pool of available buyers.15 Individual financ-
ing also offers tax advantages to the vendor.i6 The vendor may
spread realization of gain over a period of years rather than recog-
nizing it in a single year, as is the case with conventional third-party
financing.17 In addition, the vendor can shift the cost of high credit
risk to the vendee by increasing the purchase price or the rate of
interest.1 8 Furthermore, a contract for deed encourages vendors to
extend credit because security is realized quickly by means of a sim-
ple and conclusive cancellation.19
At common law, most installment land contracts provided that
"time is of the essence." 20 This provision enabled a vendor to can-
Under both mechanisms, the proceeds from the public sale are first applied to satisfy
the mortgage debt. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 559-65; G. OSBORNE,
supra note 8, § 7.11, at 446-47. For a concise discussion of mortgage foreclosure in
Minnesota, see Amundson & Rotman, supra note 8, at 813-16.
The traditional rule distinguishing contracts for deed from mortgages has re-
cently come under attack. See, e.g., Skendzel v. Marshall, 261 Ind. 226, 242, 301
N.E.2d 641, 650 (1973), cert denied, 415 U.S. 921 (1974) (where vendee's equity was
two-thirds of the contract price, the court ordered the contract foreclosed under the
mortgage statute); Sebastian v. Floyd, 585 S.W.2d 381, 383 (Ky. 1979) (no distinc-
tion between a contract for deed and a purchase money mortgage); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
TIT. 16, § 1 IA (West Supp. 1983-84 ) (similar treatment of contracts for deed and
mortgages); Uniform Land Transactions Act § 3-102(a), 13 U.L.A. 654 (1980) (tradi-
tional distinctions between contracts for deed and mortgages are not retained).
15. See Power, supra note 12, at 399. When the only available buyers lack suffi-
cient cash either to make the down payment necessary for refinancing or to buy the
seller's equity, the seller may be forced to leave his mortgage outstanding and sell to
a buyer using a contract for deed as a junior lien. Id. at 404-05. Contracts for deed
are also used to finance expensive homes when the price exceeds commercial loan
limitations imposed by state regulations. Wealthy sellers can use the land contract
for favorable tax treatment and when the buyer lacks the cash required for the down
payment. Id. at 405.
Contracts for deed are also popular in farm sales, because they aid in meeting
the increasing capital requirements of farm operations. Id. at 405-06. Finally, con-
tracts for deed are frequently used to finance income-producing property such as
motels, restaurants, and apartment houses. In these situations, conventional mort-
gage credit is often unavailable because the risk involved is relatively high. The busi-
nesses are often speculative, and the lender cannot be sure of a rapid realization on
the security in the event of default. Id. at 406-07.
16. Id at 407.
17. Id. at 400.
18. Id. at 401.
19. Wertheim, Unjust Enrichment Claim of Cancelled Vendee, 2 MINN. REAL EST. L.J.
117, 119 (1984); see infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
20. True v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 72, 74, 147 N.W. 948, 949 (1914);
Johnson v. Eklund, 72 Minn. 195, 196-98, 75 N.W. 14, 14-15 (1898). In a cancella-
tion proceeding, a court will not imply that "time is of the essence," unless the con-
tract for deed specifically contains the requirement. The vendor would then be
required to give reasonable notice. See, e.g.. Graceville State Bank v. Hofschild, 166
1986]
3
O'Connor: Property Law—Minnesota Applies the Unjust Enrichment Doctrine to
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1986
WILLIAM MITCHELL LA IV REIVIEW[
cel a contract immediately upon default by the vendee.2 1 The ven-
dor would retain the property as well as all installments paid.22
Despite the vendor's windfall gain and the vendee's substantial loss,
these forfeiture provisions were upheld because they reflected the
intent of the parties. 2 3
Many states, including Minnesota, 24 have mitigated the harsh con-
sequences of automatic cancellation.25 Several states provide a stat-
utory period of redemption to the defaulting vendee. 26 During the
Minn. 58, 61, 206 N.W. 948, 949 (1926); Austin v. Wacks, 30 Minn. 335, 339-40, 15
N.W. 409, 410-11 (1883).
A standard contract for deed specifies that "time is of the essence." Cane, Equity
and Forfeitures on Contracts for the Sale of Land, 4 U. HAWAII L. REV. 61, 61 n.3 (1982).
This implies that there will be no grace period for reinstatement or redemption. Id.;
see also Ballantine, Forfeiture for Breach of Contract, 5 MINN. L. REV. 329, 345 (1921);
Lee, Remedies for Breach of the Installment Land Contract, 19 U. MIAMI L. REV. 550, 561
(1965); Comment, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Time to Reform Vashington 's Default
Procedures for Secured Sale of Land, 17 GONZ. L. REV. 119, 123 (1981).
21. See supra note 20.
22. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 542; Note, Forfeiture and the Iowa In-
stallment Land Contract, 46 IOWA L. REV. 786, 787 (1961). Upon the vendee's default,
the vendor has several remedies available in addition to cancellation. The vendor
may (1) sue for installments due; (2) sue for specific performance of the contract; (3)
sue for damages resulting from the breach; (4) foreclose the vendee's rights; or (5)
quiet title. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 542.
23. Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 543; see Note, supra note 22, at 788. The
courts, in refusing to grant relief from forfeitures in these cases, relied on the fact
that the parties made the contract and are bound by its terms. Vanneman, Strict Fore-
closure on Land Contracts, 14 MINN. L. REV. 342, 346 (1930). The reason for the ven-
dee's default is immaterial. Id. at 347.
In Oconto Co. v. Bacon, 181 Wis. 538, 195 N.W. 412 (1923), the Wisconsin
Supreme Court stated: "Parties should have some regard and respect for the terms
of their own contracts and ought to make the terms thereof conform to their real
understanding and not rely wholly or even largely upon a court of equity for protec-
tion from their own acts." Id. at 548, 195 N.W. at 415.
24. MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1984 & Supp. 1985).
25. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
26. See, e.g., IOWA CODE §§ 656.1-.6 (1950 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. § 559.21
(1984 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to -06 (1976); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. §§ 21-50-1 to -7 (1979); see also Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 544;
Comment, Real Property: Cause of Action for Unjust Enrichment Upheld After Cancellation of
Contract for Deed, 54 MINN. L. REV. 1152, 1153 (1970). See generally Note, Cancellation of
Contracts for Deed: The Constitutionality of the Minnesota Statutor , Procedure, 58 MINN. L.
REV. 247 (1973) (discussion of forfeiture in contracts for deed).
Where legislative intervention is lacking, many courts have responded with simi-
lar ameliorating approaches. For a general discussion of judicially-created redemp-
tion periods, see Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 550-54. Other courts prefer a
more flexible approach and simply respond to the particular facts of a case in deter-
mining whether to abrogate cancellations. One frequent method used by the courts
to avoid forfeitures is to find that some act of the vendor constitutes a waiver of the
forfeiture provision in the contract. The vendor's acceptance of late payments is the
typical situation in which waiver will be found. See, e.g., Krentz v. Johnson, 36 Ill.
App. 3d 142, 343 N.E.2d 165 (1976); Soltis v. Liles, 275 Or. 537, 551 P.2d 1297
[Vol. 12
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redemption period, the vendee is given an opportunity to cure the
default.27 If the default is cured, the contract is reinstated.28
As in most jurisdictions with statutory cancellation procedures,29
the Minnesota courts have limited review to the question of whether
the parties have complied with the statutory procedures.30 The Min-
(1976); Williamson v. Wanlass, 545 P.2d 1145 (Utah 1976); but see Pacific Dev. Co. v.
Stewart, 113 Utah 403, 195 P.2d 748 (1948); see also Cohler v. Smith, 280 Minn. 181,
189, 158 N.W.2d 574, 579 (1968) (vendor has not waived when collecting rents
under claim that forfeiture is complete).
27. In Minnesota, the legislature has established a reinstatement period whereby
the vendee can avoid cancellation by curing the default. See MINN. STAT. § 559.21,
subd. 4 (1984 & Supp. 1985). The statute's predecessor was enacted in 1897. See Act
of Apr. 23, 1897, ch. 223, 1897 Minn. Laws 431. The statute's purpose was to defer
cancellation until after notice to the vendee of the default and an opportunity to cure.
See Hofschild, 166 Minn. at 61, 206 N.W. at 949. Minnesota Statutes section 559.21
originally provided that the reinstatement period would progressively lengthen as
the vendee's equity in the property grew. Accordingly, as a vendee made payments
on the property, more time was given to cure the default. See Act of Apr. 23, 1897,
ch. 223, 1897 Minn. Laws 431.
Contracts executed before August of 1976 could be terminated upon 30 days'
notice regardless of the percentage price paid under the contract. MINN. STAT.
§ 559.21, subd. 1(a). For contracts executed between August, 1976 and May, 1980,
the reinstatement period was adjusted according to the percentage of the total
purchase price paid under the contract. Id. subd. 2. But see Act of July 5, 1985, ch.
18, 1985 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. 1289 (codified at MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd.
2(a)(Supp. 1985)) (effective August 1, 1985, reinstatement period changed to a flat
60-day period for all vendees, regardless of the percentage of purchase price paid
and regardless of when the contract was executed). Id.
28. MINN. STAT. § 559.21, subd. 4(c). The statutory redemption period begins to
run when the vendor gives proper notice of intent to cancel. Id., subd. 2(a). Notice
must include an explanation of the reasons why there has been a default and the
applicable reinstatement period as defined in the statute. Id. The notice must state
that the contract will terminate at the end of the applicable time period if not rein-
stated. Id. In addition to making back payments, reinstatement includes costs of ser-
vice, mortgage registration tax, and, within limits, attorney's fees. Id.
For examples of other statutory reinstatement procedures, see IOWA CODE ANN.
§§ 651.1-.6 (West 1950 & Supp. 1985); N.D. CENr. CODE §§ 32-18-01 to -06 (1976);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 21-50-01 to -07 (1978). In Ohio, the reinstatement pe-
riod is combined with a requirement of judicial foreclosure after 20 percent of the
purchase price is paid. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 5313.05-.10 (1981).
Many states lack a comprehensive legislative scheme of regulating contracts for
deed. This is partially due to the unique treatment of mortgage foreclosure by the
states. In agricultural states such as Minnesota, Iowa, and North Dakota, legislation
has made mortgage foreclosure difficult. Thus, contracts for deed are common in
these states. See Power, supra note 12, at 401-03. See generally Prather, Foreclosure of the
Security Interest, 1957 U. ILL. L.F. 420, 450-51 (detailed discussion of foreclosure in
the fifty states).
29. See Nelson & Whitman, supra note 8, at 545; see also Note, supra note 22, at 788
(suggesting that legislative regulation of contract for deed cancellation tends to insti-
tutionalize forfeitures, and therefore, courts in these jurisdictions emphasize techni-
cal compliance over independent analyses of fairness).
30. See supra notes 27-28. For other cancellation statutes, see supra note 26.
19861
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nesota Supreme Court consistently has held that a cancelled vendee
has no right to a refund of payments made under the contract re-
gardless of the harsh results. 3' Thus, after the contract for deed is
terminated by cancellation, the vendee cannot bring a claim against
the vendor. 32 As a result, any action for damages under a cancelled
31. Wayzata Enterprises, Inc. v. Herman, 268 Minn. 117, 119, 128 N.W.2d 156,
158 (1964); See Andresen v. Simon, 171 Minn. 168, 170, 213 N.W. 563, 564 (1927);
Nelson Real Estate Agency v. Seeman, 147 Minn. 354, 357, 180 N.W. 227, 229
(1920); Citizens' State Bank of Twin Valley v. Moebeck, 143 Minn. 291, 297, 173
N.W. 853, 855 (1919).
The result is based upon the fact that a cancelled vendee no longer owns the
property. Consequently, any claim based upon the contract is eliminated. See Olson
v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 126 Minn. 229, 231-32, 148 N.W. 67, 68 (1914). Statutory
cancellation also precludes any claim under the contract to recover payments made.
See id. at 233-34, 148 N.W. at 69. This is referred to as the Olson rule. See also Mc-
Manus v. Blockmarr, 47 Minn. 331, 335, 50 N.W. 230, 231 (1891) (preclusion of
recovery is so widely accepted that it does not require citation of authorities).
For similar holdings in other jurisdictions, see generally Sawyer v. Sterling Re-
alty Co., 41 Cal. App. 2d 715, 107 P.2d 449 (1940) (denying an action by the default-
ing vendee for recovery in installment payments under the theory of unjust
enrichment); Beatty v. Flannery, 49 So.2d 81 (Fla. 1950) (defaulting vendee who be-
lieved that title to the property was unmarketable could not recover payments made
under that contract); Dimon v. Wright, 206 Iowa 693, 214 N.W. 673 (1927) (not
allowing a defaulting vendee to recover the initial payment on the contract because
equity does not allow one to gain from his own breach); McCain v. Hicks, 150 La. 43,
90 So. 506 (1921) (denying vendee's prior payments under the contract after default
even though the vendee was not satisfied with the land); King v. Milliken, 248 Mass.
460, 143 N.E. 511 (1924) (vendee, who defaulted on the contract after the vendor
refused an extension for a complete registration of title, was held not entitled to
recovery of a $500 deposit made as partial payment on the contract); In re First Nat'l
Bank of Adrian v. Dalton, 207 Mo. App. 115, 230 S.W. 358 (1921) (vendee who
defaulted on the basis of a bad faith objection to title was held not entitled to recov-
ery of earnest money); Gilmore v. Cover, 134 Neb. 559, 279 N.W. 177 (1938) (de-
faulting vendee not entitled to recovery of a down payment made on the contract
because the vendor had engaged in no wrongful conduct); Mikulich v. Diltz, 71 Nev.
115, 281 P.2d 800 (1955) (vendee who made improvements to the land, and who
subsequently failed to make the down payment on the contract, held not entitled to
recover the cost or value of the improvements); Fleischer v. Lockwood Lumber Co.,
258 A.D. 900, 16 N.Y.S.2d 205 (1939) (counterclaim by a defaulting vendee for re-
covery of the down payment was denied since the vendee was not willing or ready to
perform); Harrington v. Eggen, 51 N.D. 87, 199 N.W. 447 (1924) (defaulting vendee
not entitled to recovery of payments after vendor resold the land to a third party);
Jackson v. Peddycoart, 98 Okla. 198, 224 P. 689 (1924) (defaulting vendee not enti-
tled to refund of payments made); Seekins v. King, 66 R.I. 105, 17 A.2d 869 (1941)
(defaulting vendee not entitled to recovery of payments since vendor was not guilty
of fraud, nor did he retain a benefit which was "shocking to the conscience of the
court").
32. See Olson, 126 Minn. at 231-32, 148 N.W. at 68-69. In Olson, the vendor
agreed to sell 320 acres of land to the vendee for $4,640. The vendor executed a
contract for deed that required the vendee to make 10 annual installments. The ven-
dee made an initial down payment of $464, but he failed to make further payments
for two years. The vendor served the vendee with a statutory notice of intention to
cancel the contract. The vendee, however, did not attempt to cure his default, but
[Vol. 12
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contract is absolutely barred.33
There is a narrow exception to the rule; specifically, post-cancella-
tion rescission for fraud. 34 This remedy, however, is reserved for
rather blatant abuses and is limited to situations where the vendee
would have been justified in rescinding the contract prior to cancel-
rather, sued the vendor for fraudulent misrepresentation inducing execution of the
contract. The vendee sought damages of $1,440. The damages represented the dif-
ference in value of the land in its actual, as opposed to its represented, condition. Id.
at 229-30, 148 N.W. at 68.
The court denied recovery to the vendee. The court stated that since the con-
tract had been cancelled, the vendee no longer possessed any rights in the property,
and consequently, could not predicate damages upon the contract. Id. at 231-33, 148
N.W. at 68-69. The court stated the following:
It cannot be that a person may enter a contract to buy property for a large
sum to be thereafter paid, never make the payments agreed upon, suffer the
other party to cancel the contract by reason of the default, and then sue and
recover heavy damages for deceit inducing him to buy property which he
never saw fit to accept or pay for.
Id. Thus, the court held that before damages may be recovered, it must appear that
the vendee had accepted the property and that there remained an obligation to pay
for it. Id.
The Olson court noted that the vendee could have chosen to seek recovery only
of the money paid on the contract, through an action at law for money had and re-
ceived, regardless of vendor's cancellation of the contract. Id. at 234, 148 N.W. at 69.
The court stated that such an action would be considered the same as one for rescis-
sion and would be governed by the principles used in equity to rescind for fraud. Id.
As a result, once the contract for deed has been cancelled in Minnesota, a vendee
may not maintain an action against the vendor for false representations.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Brown pointed to the illogic of allowing a ven-
dor, after obtaining a vendee's money by fraud, to secure legal sanction for the reten-
tion of the money merely by cancellation of the tainted contract. Id. at 236, 148 N.W.
at 70. Justice Brown, contrary to the majority, felt that justice dictated allowing the
vendee to pursue his fraud claim despite cancellation of the contract by the vendor.
Id. at 237, 148 N.W. at 71.
Despite criticism, however, Olson remains the law in Minnesota, and as such,
once a contract for deed is cancelled, a vendee may not maintain an action against the
vendor for false representations regarding the contract.
For an explanation and criticism of the Olson rule, see Note, supra note 26, at 250
(arguing that a fraud action should survive cancellation because it is not based on the
contract).
33. See West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 171, 231 N.W. 826, 827 (1930); Olson,
126 Minn. at 231, 148 N.W. at 68.
34. See, e.g., Gable v. Niles Holding Co., 209 Minn. 445, 447, 296 N.W. 525, 527
(1941) (defaulting vendee recovered payments on a contract for deed after statutory
cancellation, since fraud was used to induce the vendee to purchase the property);
Woodward v. Western Can. Colonization Co., 134 Minn. 8, 10-11, 158 N.W. 706,
707 (1916) (vendee allowed to recover payments made prior to discovery of the fraud
even though vendee had defaulted).
The policy behind the strict rule is to encourage parties to fix their rights in
advance so the parties know to what extent each is bound. G. OSBORNE, supra note 8,
§ 3.26, at 80-81 (forfeiture has been routinely enforced to uphold the intent of the
parties); Note, supra note 8, at 788.
1986]
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lation due to the vendor's fraud. 35 Beyond this exception, a vendee
in default cannot maintain an action in equity.3 6
An action for unjust enrichment is permitted whenever the prop-
erty of another has been obtained which in equity and good con-
science ought to be returned.3 7 One must return property obtained
from another, however, only when it has been unjustly retained.38
The mere fact that a person benefits from another is not itself suffi-
cient to require restitution. 39
35. See Gable, 209 Minn. at 447, 296 N.W. at 526-27 (vendee defrauded into trad-
ing her home for a fourplex by misrepresentations regarding her ability to make pay-
ments); see also Raach v. Haverly, 269 N.W.2d 877, 880-81 (Minn. 1978) (refusing to
apply the Olson rule to real estate broker who made misrepresentations to a buyer).
The supreme court actually has found a situation justifying post-cancellation re-
scission for fraud in only one case. Wertheim, supra note 19, at 118 & n. 11, (citing
Gable, 209 Minn. 445, 296 N.W. 525).
36. Although the Minnesota courts have suggested that a cancelled vendee might
recover under general equitable principles such as money had and received or unjust
enrichment, this relief consistently has been denied.
"Money had and received" is an equitable remedy compelling one unjustly en-
riched at the expense of another to disgorge the profit made. See Todd v. Bettingen,
109 Minn. 493, 498, 124 N.W. 443, 446 (1910).
The Olson court stated that an action for money had and received "might be
considered virtually the same as one for rescission and would be governed by the
principles which are applied in equity suits to rescind for fraud." 126 Minn. at 234,
148 N.W. at 69. Despite these words, the Olson court denied such relief, as have
other subsequent decisions. Olson, 126 Minn. at 234-35, 148 N.W. at 69-70; see also
West v. Walker, 181 Minn. 169, 231 N.W. 826 (1930); International Realty & Sec.
Corp. v. Vanderpoel, 127 Minn. 89, 148 N.W. 895 (1914).
In Cady v. Bush, 283 Minn. 105, 166 N.W.2d 358 (1969), the Minnesota
Supreme Court declared that Minnesota law allowed recovery by a defaulting vendee
where it would be "morally wrong for one party to enrich himself at the expense of
another." Id. at 110, 166 N.W.2d at 362. Similarly, in Zirinsky v. Sheehan, 413 F.2d
481 (8th Cir. 1969), the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted Minnesota law
as allowing a defaulting vendee to recover previous payments even in the absence of
fraud or mistake. Id. at 486-90.
Both Zirinsky and Cady, however, denied recovery because it was not shown that
the vendor was unjustly enriched. In Cady, the court demonstrated what was neces-
sary to prove "moral wrongdoing" by deciding that the vendee could not recover if
he could not prove fraud by the vendor. Cady, 283 Minn. at 110, 166 N.W.2d at 362.
In Zirinsky, recovery was denied because the vendee could not show that he was enti-
tled to a sum in excess of the vendor's damages. Zirinsky, 413 F.2d at 490. The
Zirinsky court centered its analysis upon Minnesota cases involving fraud. See id. at
484-90.
37. The principle of unjust enrichment is recognized throughout the United
States. It should be noted, however, that the overwhelming weight of authority de-
nies restitution to defaulting vendees under a contract for deed. See, e.g., Melton v.
Amar, 86 Idaho 262, 385 P.2d 406 (1963); Graves v. Winer, 351 S.W.2d 193 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1961); Davies v. Boyd, 73 N.M. 85, 385 P.2d 950 (1963).
38. See, e.g., Gard v. Razanskas, 248 Iowa 1333, 1339, 85 N.W.2d 612, 616
(1957).
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The principle of unjust enrichment will not be invoked simply be-
cause one party has made a bad bargain.40 The Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated that equity will not rewrite or abrogate contracts to
protect parties from consequences which were reasonably foresee-
able when the contract was executed.4 1 Early in the century, the
Minnesota Supreme Court described the situations in which the doc-
trine of unjust enrichment would be applied. Fraud has been the
primary basis for an action in unjust enrichment.42 Mistake, failure
of consideration, or money obtained through imposition, extortion,
oppression, or undue advantage are other situations where an action
based on unjust enrichment is appropriate.43 Moreover, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court stated that unjust enrichment can be applied in
situations where it would be "morally wrong" for one party to be-
come enriched at the expense of another.44
In Zirinsky v. Sheehan,45 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals applied
40. Cady, 283 Minn. at 110, 166 N.W.2d at 362.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 110, 166 N.W.2d at 361 (action resulting from cancellation of a
contract for the sale of real estate; while the supreme court found no actionable
fraud, it did recognize that a cause of action could be maintained on that basis); Gable,
209 Minn. at 447, 296 N.W. at 527 (widow traded her home as a down payment on a
contract for deed; the fraud related to her ability to make the payments); Olson, 126
Minn. at 234, 148 N.W. at 69 (misrepresentation of quality and character of land
inducing vendee to enter into contract).
43. Anderson v. DeLisle, 352 N.W.2d 794, 796 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
44. See Klass v. Twin City Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 291 Minn. 68, 71, 190 N.W.2d
493, 495 (1971) (allowing recovery in absence of fraud or mistake); Cady, 283 Minn.
at 110, 166 N.W.2d at 361. In Cady, the court stated that a cause of action in unjust
enrichment could be based on "situations where it would be morally wrong for one
party to enrich himself at the expense of another." Id. The Klass court reaffirmed the
validity of this proposition. Klass, 291 Minn. at 71, 190 N.W.2d at 495.
45. 413 F.2d 481 (8th Cir. 1969), cert denied, 396 U.S. 1059 (1970). In Zirinsky,
the plaintiff agreed to purchase 560 acres of real estate from a corporation for
$2,750,000. The parties entered into a contract for deed, which called for a down
payment of $50,000, two installments of $225,000, a final installment of $850,000,
and the assumption of a $1,400,000 mortgage. The plaintiff made the first three
installments totalling $500,000, but was unable to pay the final installment of
$850,000. The corporation thereupon notified Zirinsky of its intention to cancel the
contract and to retain the $500,000 as provided in a liquidated damages provisions of
the contract. Id. at 482-83.
Zirinsky brought suit to have the contract reformed, the liquidated damages pro-
visions declared invalid as a penalty, the notice of termination declared ineffective,
rescission of the contract because of defendant's breach, or for damages because of
defendant's unjust enrichment. Recovery was denied on all theories. Id at 483.
The Eighth Circuit recognized the Minnesota rule that once a contract has been
terminated, all rights on the part of both vendee and vendor are also terminated. Id.
at 484-85. Termination of the contract does not, however, preclude a vendee's suit
for unjust enrichment. Id. at 486.
The court also held that since the vendor had cancelled the contract, it could
not seek retention of damages under the liquidated damages clause since the contract
1986]
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Minnesota law and suggested that a cancelled vendee could recover
when there was no fraud.46 Traditionally, relief for unjust enrich-
ment in contract for deed cancellation cases was limited to cases in-
volving fraud. 47 The court stated that a vendee could recover
payments made in excess of the vendor's damages under a theory of
unjust enrichment.48 The Zirinsky decision has been criticized as mis-
stating Minnesota law and ignoring Minnesota's rule prohibiting a
nonfraud recovery by a cancelled vendee.49
In Anderson, the Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether an unjust enrichment action could be maintained in the ab-
sence of fraud.50 On July 31, 1979, Richard Andersen signed an ear-
nest money contract to purchase real estate from Thomas DeLisle
for $275,000.51 The earnest money contract provided that the
purchase was contingent upon the sale of Andersen's residence.52
From the beginning of the negotiations, DeLisle was aware of Ander-
sen's financial difficulties. Between July and October, the parties had
several discussions concerning Andersen's financial problems.53
had been terminated. Id. at 485-86. Rather, the vendor's rights must be determined
under the statutory cancellation. Id. at 486. A review of Minnesota law indicated that
the vendor could retain a fair equivalent of the actual damages sustained from failure
to perform the contract and no more. Id. at 487.
The Zirinskv court noted that Minnesota has "repeatedly recognized actions
based upon a theory of unjust enrichment in real estate contracts." Id. at 488. The
court then proceeded to cite three Minnesota cases dealing with post-cancellation
rescission for fraud: Cady, 283 Minn. at 105, 166 N.W.2d at 358 (theory of unjust
enrichment not meant to aid one who voluntarily enters a binding contract); Gable,
209 Minn. at 445, 296 N.W. at 525 (unjust enrichment allows recovery for money had
and received); West, 181 Minn. at 169, 231 N.W. at 827 (vendor's statutory cancella-
tion prevents vendee's suit for fraud).
The Eighth Circuit declared that it was unimportant that these cases involved
fraud, because Minnesota courts have recognized that "cancellation per se does not
prevent a suit for unjust enrichment on executory real estate contracts in Minn-
nesota." Zirinsky, 413 F.2d at 488. To support this statement, the court cited Todd v.
Bettingen, 109 Minn. 493, 124 N.W. 443 (1910). Zirinsky, 413 F.2d at 488. Todd,
however, did not involve an executory real estate contract, nor did it even discuss
such a contract.
The Eighth Circuit denied recovery to the plaintiff because the plaintiff failed to
establish entitlement to a sum in excess of the defendant's actual damage. Id. at 490;
see also Wertheim, supra note 19, at 118-19.
46. Zirinsky, 413 F.2d at 489; see Wertheim, supra note 19, at 118.
47. See supra notes 33, 34 and accompanying text.
48. Ziiinsky, 413 F.2d at 489-90.
49. Wertheim, supra note 19, at 118; Comment, supra note 26, at 1154.
50. Anderson,, 352 N.W.2d 794, 795-96.
51. Id. at 795.
52. Brief for the Appellant at A- 13, Anderson v. DeLisle, 352 N.W.2d 794 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1984).
53. Id. at A-25. At one point, the parties renegotiated the original purchase
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Before the earnest money contract was signed, Andersen began mak-
ing improvements on the DeLisle property. 54 Although DeLisle, the
vendor, did not expressly consent to the work, the improvements
were made with his knowledge.55
The parties entered into a contract for deed on December 31,
1979.56 At this point in time, Andersen had completed the improve-
ments by spending $25,000 on labor and materials.57 The improve-
ments enhanced the value of the property by $47,000.58 DeLisle
knew at the execution of the contract that Andersen's financial
problems had not abated.59 He also knew that Andersen probably
would be unable to perform under the contract.60
The contract executed by the parties contained standard language
which is found in the printed forms commonly used in Minnesota. 6
The contract specified that all existing improvements were the prop-
erty of DeLisle. 62 In addition, the contract provided that upon An-
dersen's default and cancellation, all improvements and payments
belonged to the vendor as liquidated damages.63
Andersen's down payment check was dishonored.64 DeLisle can-
celled the contract.6 5 As a result, Andersen never took possession of
the property.6 6 Andersen sued DeLisle to recover the value of the
improvements made under a theory of unjust enrichment.67
The trial judge submitted the issue of unjust enrichment to the
jury which found that the DeLisles were unjustly enriched.68 Ander-
sen was awarded $47,000 for enhancing the property's value.69 The
trial judge later granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and







61. See MINN. STAT. § 507.14, Forms 54-57.
62. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 795.
63. Id. Agreed Statement of the Record at 2 (appended to Appellant's Informal
Brief and Appendix).
64. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 795.
65. Id.; see MINN. STAT. § 559.21 (1982).
66. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 795. DeLisle cancelled the contract in accordance
with Minnesota statutes section 559.21. Under this statute, the vendor may termi-
nate the contract by serving upon the vendee a notice specifying the conditions in
which default has been made, and stating that the contract will terminate 60 days
after service of the notice, unless the vendee complies with certain conditions out-
lined in the statute, including, of course, cure of the default. See MINN. Stat. § 559.21
(1982).
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Andersen appealed.70
The Minnesota Court of Appeals upheld Andersen's claim for un-
just enrichment and remanded the case to the trial court with in-
structions to enter judgment in favor of Andersen for his
expenditures totaling $25,000.7 1 The effect of the court's decision is
that a defaulting vendee under a contract for deed can bring a cause
of action in Minnesota for unjust enrichment despite the absence of
fraud.72
Despite the criticism of the Zirinsky decision7 3 and its non-binding
effect,74 the court of appeals relied on Zirinsky for its conclusion that
statutory cancellation does not preclude a suit for unjust enrichment
on executory real estate contracts in Minnesota. 7 5 The court stated
that fraud and mistake are not the only grounds for recovery in an
unjust enrichment action. 76 The court concluded that an action in
unjust enrichment is appropriate in circumstances where it would be
"morally wrong" for a party to enrich himself at the expense of
another. 7
7
Although there was no fraud or mistake, 78 the court of appeals
concluded that a jury reasonably could find that equity and good
conscience required DeLisle to compensate Andersen for the im-
provements. 79 The court emphasized that DeLisle stood silent while
Andersen made extensive improvements to the property.SO Also sig-
nificant to the court was DeLisle's knowledge of Andersen's precari-
ous financial condition. DeLisle contracted to retain the
improvements upon default knowing that because of Andersen's fi-
nancial problems, a default was imminent.8 '
At the same time, however, the court of appeals recognized Ander-
sen's wrongdoing.8 2 The court held that Andersen should be
70. Id.
71. Id. at 796. The trial judge found that he had committed an error of law by
submitting the issue of unjust enrichment to the jury in the absence of any evidence
of fraud or mistake on the vendor's part. Id. at 795.
72. Id. at 796.
73. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
74. The Eighth Circuit's statement in Zirinsky that Minnesota recognizes an ac-
tion in unjust enrichment by a cancelled vendee was dicta and has been criticized as a
misinterpretation of Minnesota law. See supra note 47. In addition, the Eighth Cir-
cuit's statement is not binding precedent. A federal court's interpretation of state
law is binding only upon the parties presenting the state law issue to the federal
court.
75. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796.
76. Id.
77. Id.




82. See id. The court refused to condone Andersen's behavior by awarding him
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awarded no more than $25,000, the actual cost of the improvements,
even though the improvements enhanced the value of the property
by $47,000.83 Andersen signed a contract for deed knowing he was
financially unable to perform.84 The court specifically stated that to
award Andersen more than the cost of the improvements would re-
ward him for defaulting on the contract.85 The court acknowledged
that its decisions contravened the general rule that recovery for un-
just enrichment is based upon what the person enriched has re-
ceived, rather than what the opposing party has lost.86 Nevertheless,
the court decided that it would be grossly inequitable for Andersen
to recover more than the actual cost of the improvements.87
The court of appeals cited Cady v. Bush88 as support for the propo-
sition that a claim for unjust enrichment by a cancelled vendee is
justifiable where there has been moral wrongdoing.89 The court ne-
glected to mention, however, that Cady also states that the theory of
unjust enrichment will not be invoked to protect parties from conse-
quences reasonably foreseeable when the contract was entered
into.9O According to the facts as set forth by the court, it was fore-
seeable to both parties that Andersen would eventually default and
that the contract would be cancelled.91 It was also foreseeable that
upon default and cancellation, Andersen's improvements would re-
main with DeLisle as liquidated damages.92 This forfeiture was writ-
ten into the contract.93 Under the Cady holding, Andersen should
not be protected by the doctrine of unjust enrichment, since the for-
feiture of improvements was reasonably foreseeable when the parties
entered into the contract.
In addition, the facts of this case did not fall within that category of
circumstances that are so shocking that the court is compelled to
grant relief. The vendor, DeLisle, was enriched by Andersen's ef-
the value of the improvements he made. Rather, he was given the cost of those im-
provements. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. The court also noted that Andersen began to make improvements before
the earnest money contract was signed and before obtaining consent from DeLisle.
Id.
85. Id. Andersen's down payment check was dishonored and he made no further
payments. Id.
86. Id.; see also Zirinsky, 413 F.2d at 489; Georgopolis v. George, 237 Minn. 176,
185, 54 N.W.2d 137, 142 (1952).
87. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796.
88. 283 Minn. 105, 166 N.W.2d 358 (1969).
89. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796.
90. Cady, 283 Minn. at 110, 166 N.W.2d at 362.
91. Both parties were aware of the circumstances and negotiated the contract
with Andersen's financial problems in mind. See supra note 53 and accompanying
text.
92. See Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 795.
93. Id.; see also supra note 63.
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forts, but it is not clear that DeLisle's enrichment was unjust. The
contract was freely negotiated.94 DeLisle may have stood silent
while Andersen made the improvements, 95 but certainly this is not
unreasonable behavior. DeLisle anticipated that Andersen would
purchase the property. Although DeLisle was aware of Andersen's
financial problems,96 he may have believed they would be resolved in
the near future.
In any event, Andersen was in the best position to assess his own
financial condition. Andersen was clearly more aware of his inability
to satisfy the terms of the contract than was DeLisle, yet he still
signed the contract. Moreover, Andersen began making improve-
ments before the earnest money contract was signed.97 Even though
he had no rights in the property, he decided to invade the land and
altered its character without obtaining express consent from the
owner.')8 In addition, Andersen's first check under the contract for
deed was dishonored,99 and he made no further effort to retain the
property.OO The court of appeals, however, felt it was equitable to
uphold Andersen's recovery because of DeLisle's wrongdoing.OI
The court of appeals awarded Andersen his out-of-pocket costs in-
stead of the amount of DeLisle's enrichment,' 0 2 which suggests that
the court was treating the case as an action for damages of fraud
even though there was no fraud.103 Even if there had been fraud, an
94. See Respondent's Brief and Appendix at A-15, Anderson v. DeLisle, 352
N.W.2d 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (there was no evidence of fraud or wrongdoing by
the defendant).
95. See Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796.
96. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
97. See Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See Appellant's Brief and Appendix, supra note 52, at A-15. Andersen never
possessed the property in the sense of "use" or "enjoyment". Id.
101. See Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796.
102. The out-of-pocket rule is used in fraud damage actions. Wertheim, supra
note 19, at 117. The rule allows recovery of the difference between the amount paid
and the value of the property bought. Olson, 126 Minn. at 232, 148 N.W. at 69; Wer-
theim, supra note 19, at 117. The Olson court reasoned that this rule is not applicable
in cases where the property purchased has been forfeited under a cancelled contract
for deed because the vendee retains no property the value of which can be deducted
from what has been paid. The vendee in default must return the property to the
vendor. The contract is extinguished.
103. Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796. In upholding recovery for Andersen, the court
of appeals failed to acknowledge that a plaintiff seeking relief through equity must
come into the court with "clean hands." See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto-
motive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806 (1945). The clean hands doctrine bars
relief to those guilty of improper conduct in the matter as to which they seek relief.
Id. at 814-15. This doctrine protects the integrity of the court and reflects public
policy by ensuring that equitable powers are not wasted on undeserving plaintiffs.
See Gaudiosi v. Mellon, 269 F.2d 873, 881-82 (3rd Cir. 1959). In this case, Ander-
[Vol. 12
14
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 12, Iss. 2 [1986], Art. 6
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol12/iss2/6
UNJUST ENRICHMENT
action for damages by a cancelled vendee is absolutely barred under
Minnesota case law.104 The Anderson court allowed recovery because
the vendee's out-of-pocket expenses exceeded the vendor's dam-
ages.1O5 The court's decision is baffling since Andersen's behavior
could be viewed as significantly more blameworthy than DeLisle's.106
This is simply not a case which factually justifies recovery by the can-
celled vendee in the absence of any fraud on the vendor's part. In
addition, the court's failure to analyze the case in light of prior case
law leaves current Minnesota case law on contract for deed cancella-
tion unclear.
While Anderson only involved recovery of the costs of improve-
ments,' 07 the court did not distinguish these costs from payments
under the contract. The court's reliance on Zirinsky suggests that the
unjust enrichment action may be open to vendees seeking recovery
of payments. 10 8 After Anderson, vendors risk liability for all payments
made upon default of the vendee. Vendors also risk liability for the
costs of improvements made to the property. 09
The court of appeals, however, attempted to limit the Anderson
holding in Brakke v. Hilgers. I 10 In dicta, the Brakke court indicated
sen's complaint of unjust enrichment arises only because of his own default on the
contract. A party to a contract for deed cannot breach the contract and secure a right
to the detriment of the other party. Miller v. Snedeker, 257 Minn. 204, 217, 101
N.W.2d 213, 223 (1960).
104. See Olson, 126 Minn. at 232, 148 N.W. at 68.
105. See Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 796; Wertheim, supra note 19, at 119.
106. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
107. See Anderson, 352 N.W.2d at 795.
108. See Zirinsky, 413 F.2d at 483. The court in ZilinskY stated:
[T]he court made it clear the vendee had the burden of showing the fraud to
receive back his whole purchase price. In the instant case in order to estab-
lish any actionable wrong the defaulting vendee must show he is entitled to
a sum in excess of defendant's actual damage. . . .[P]laintiff failed to prove
any unjust enrichment to the defendant.
Id. at 490. The Zirinsky court seems to be saying that if the plaintiff had shown he was
entitled to a sum in excess of the defendant's actual damages, he would have proven
unjust enrichment. The Anderson court used Zirinsky to support its approval of an
action in unjust enrichment for the recovery of improvements even though the plain-
tiff in Zirinsky sought recovery of payments. Since the Anderson court cited ZirinskV
approvingly, the inference is that it would uphold a defaulting vendee's claim for the
recovery of payments if the payments exceeded the vendor's damages. See Wertheim,
supra note 19, at 119.
109. The cost of the improvements could easily be many times the property's con-
tract price. Many vendors are not in a position to buy out their vendee's interest.
110. 374 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). Brakke involved the sale of property
under a contract for deed. Under the contract, the vendees were to make annual
payments commencing on November 1, 1983. The vendees made the first payment,
but failed to make any further payments. Before defaulting, the vendees had made
extensive improvements to the property. Id. at 555. The vendors commenced can-
cellation proceedings, and the notice of cancellation was filed on December 11, 1984.
On the same date, the vendees filed a labor and material lien against the property.
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that according to the facts of the case, a cause of action for unjust
enrichment was unwarranted, since the vendors could not anticipate
that the vendees would have difficulty in meeting their financial obli-
gations under the contract."' The court distinguished Anderson on
the basis that the vendor in Anderson was aware that the vendee would
be unable to make the required payments.' 12
Even though the court's discussion in Brakke attempts to limit the
application of the unjust enrichment doctrine, the analysis fails to
address an important issue left unanswered in Anderson; specifically,
to what degree will a vendor's knowledge of a vendee's financial in-
stability create liability under the doctrine if the contract is substan-
tially cancelled. As a result, both cases recognize that a vendor has
an obligation to refrain from entering a contract for deed with a ven-
dee who has questionable financial standing. Neither case, however,
defines the parameters of the requisite vendor inquiry or examina-
tion. Consequently, this inquiry will require judicial resolution in
many cases.
Unless the unjust enrichment doctrine is limited to a further de-
gree by either the court of appeals or the supreme court, the Anderson
holding will continue to have a major impact on future contract of
deed cancellations in Minnesota. The uncertainty created by these
cases could negatively influence the use of this alternative method of
financing, thereby making it more difficult for many individuals to
purchase real property. The courts should examine this factor in fu-
ture analyses of the doctrine.
Kathleen O'Connor
The vendors sued to quiet title. Id. In a separate suit, the vendees sued to recover
the cost of the improvements and the payments made under the contract for deed.
Id. The trial court dismissed the vendees' complaint on the grounds that it failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Id.
On appeal, the vendees claimed that they were entitled to damages for unjust
enrichment for the improvements they made to the land. Id. The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court's dismissal by indicating that the vendees' original complaint
failed to assert a claim for unjust enrichment. Id. at 556. In dicta, the court went on
to state that even if the complaint contained an unjust enrichment claim, the facts did
not satisfy the parameters of a cause of action under the doctrine. Id.
111. The court specifically stated that the "Brakkes' claims do not indicate Hilgers
plotted unfair advantage of the Brakkes or anticipated from the beginning the Brak-
kes would be unable to meet their contractual obligations." Id. at 556.
112. The court distinguished Anderson in the following analysis:
In Anderson we determined a cause of action existed for unjust enrichment
where the vendor remained silent and watched the vendee make extensive
improvements to the property, knowing that because of the vendee's finan-
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